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Constitution Act, 1980: Is It Constitutional?
ROBERT W. KERR*
The history of constitutional amendment in Canada supports the 
inference that the residual power of amendment in the United 
Kingdom Parliament was intended to preserve the federal core of the 
constitution where no government within Canada could act 
unilaterally. The courts could legally enforce this intention through 
their interpretation of the amending power. Recent decisions 
interpreting the amending powers of the Canadian Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures rely on historical intention. For Canadian 
purposes there is good reason to apply the same process of judicial 
review to the amending power of the United Kingdom Parliament. 
The author suggests that the best way out of the present constitutional 
stalemate within Canada, if  one indeed exists, would be by reference to 
the Canadian people in a referendum, rather than to the Canadian 
Parliament which is likely to be biased.
Lorsque l'on regarde l'histoire des modifications constitutionnelles au 
Canada, on en déduit indubitablement que le pouvoir résiduaire de 
modifier confié au Royaume-Uni, avait pour but la préservation du 
caractère fédéral de la constitution en vertu duquel aucun 
gouvernement au sein du Canada ne pouvait agir unilatéralement. 
Par interprétation, les tribunaux pourraient soutenir et faire valoir 
cette approche. De récentes décisions au Canada interprétant ce 
pouvoir de modifier en fon t d'ailleurs foi. i l  existe des raisons valables 
susceptibles de justifier l'application, au Canada, du même processus 
de révision judiciaire que celui existant au Royaume-Uni, en ce qui 
concerne ce pouvoir de modifier. L'auteur suggère que la meilleure 
façon de sortir d'une telle impasse constitutionnelle, si elle existe, serait 
de recourir à une consultation auprès du peuple canadien par voie de 
référendum plutôt qu’au Parlement canadien où pourrait se déceler 
des préjugés.
INTRODUCTION
T h e  C anadian central governm ent’s Proposed Resolution for a Jo in t 
Address to H er Majesty the Q ueen Respecting the Constitution o f 
C anada 1 has tu rned  the p rocedure for constitutional reform  in C anada
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from  one o f the m ore troublesom e academic questions o f o u r 
constitutional law into one o f the hottest political issues o f the day. This 
article will first exam ine the contention that the central governm ent’s 
proposals are unconstitutional to see on what foundation, legal o r  
otherw ise, this contention is based. It will then consider the leading 
argum ents in support o f  the constitutionality o f  these proposals, and 
finally, it will review the practical implications o f  a conclusion that these 
proposals are unconstitutional.
It is only fair to the reader to note that the w riter began his 
research with a bias against the course o f action being taken by the 
central governm ent. This bias was not against the contents o f  the 
proposed constitutional am endm ents, but entirely against the process by 
which they are being achieved. As work has progressed, a line o f  
reasoning strongly opposed to this process has em erged. W hether the 
initial bias has m ade it impossible to fairly consider the opposite side o f  
the argum ent, only an im partial reader can determ ine. In the short run , 
it may be doubtful w hether this article is likely to reach the attention o f  
any such person.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
T h e  proposal o f  the central governm ent involves substantial reform  
o f the Canadian constitution in two m ajor areas, namely, the imposition 
o f limits on the powers o f  the C anadian and provincial legislative bodies 
by creation o f  a C harter o f  Rights and Freedom s, and the establishm ent 
o f a new p rocedure by which any fu tu re  constitutional reform  would 
have to be carried o u t.2 T he  p rocedure the central governm ent is 
pursu ing  in introducing these reform s is the adoption o f  a resolution by 
the Senate and H ouse o f  Com mons requesting such am endm ents and 
the passage o f  legislation by the U nited Kingdom Parliament. T his 
action is being taken with the consent o f  two provincial Prem iers,3 and 
over the vehem ent objections o f six o thers.4 T h e  o ther two provincial 
Prem iers are offering  respectively less than com plete consent5 and less 
than vehem ent objection.6
JWhile much has been made of two other features, the creation of a commitment toward equalization of 
opportunities among the regions o f Canada, and the late addition o f increased provincial power over 
natural resources, it seems a fair assessment that neither involves major reform. Moreover, it seems 
unlikely that either or both, if they were being proposed separately from the rest o f the central 
government’s constitutional package, would be the cause o f any constitutional crisis.
3Premier Davis o f Ontario and Premier Hatfield o f New Brunsw ick.
'Prem ier Bennett of British Columbia. Premier Levesque o f Quebec, Premier Lougheed of Alberta, 
Premier Lyon o f Manitoba, Premier MacLean o f Prince Edward Island, and Premier Peckford of 
Newfoundland and Labrador.
5Premier Blakeney of Saskatchewan.
®Premier Buchanan of Nova Scotia.
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Although preceded by a twenty year period o f  in term ittent 
federal-provincial discussion o f  constitutional reform , federal-provincial 
consultation most directly relevant to the present proposal took the form 
o f  th ree m onths o f fairly intensive discussion am ong officials followed by 
a week-long conference o f  the Prime M inister and Prem iers in the 
sum m er o f 1980. T h e  reform s being proposed by the central governm ent 
were part o f  a larger group  o f proposals u n d er discussion at that time. 
T h e  exact contents o f  the actual reform s now being carried forw ard by 
the central governm ent were decided upon only after this discussion 
ended, although the central governm ent had indicated th roughout the 
discussions that it was insistent upon the inclusion o f a charter o f rights 
and patriation o f the am ending p rocedure in any constitutional reform . 
It also had m ade known that it contem plated acting alone if no 
agreem ent could be reached with the Premiers.
In discussing the p rocedure being followed by the central 
governm ent, a distinction m ust be recognized between legal constitu­
tional requirem ents and non-legal constitutional requirem ents. Legal 
constitutional requirem ents are those that will be m aintained by 
o u r courts un d er their recognized jurisdiction to review the actions o f 
o th er agencies o f governm ent. Non-legal requirem ents are ones which 
the courts will not m aintain, and which therefore can ultimately be 
upheld only by the political process.
T h e  only absolutely clear requirem ent for constitutional am endm ent 
in C anada is that an am endm ent m ust be passed as a statute by one o f 
th iee  legislative bodies — the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent, the Canadian 
Parliam ent, o r  a provincial legislature. Which o f these bodies is to pass a 
particular am endm ent depends on how the am endm ent is properly 
characterized. A provincial legislature can enact an am endm ent:
o f  the Constitution o f  the Province, except as regards the Office o f  
Lieutenant Governor.7
7The British North America Act, 1867, 30 8c 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.), s. 92(1). (For convenience o f reference, 
this A d and its amendments will be cited in subsequent ftxitnotes simply as the B.N.A. Act, except 
where, as in footnote 8, infra, the existence o f an amendment is itself significant.)
A side issue which is not relevant to the current dispute, but which deserves mention in the interest 
o f comprehensiveness, is whether the Office o f Lieutenant Governor is a m atter for constitutional 
amendment by the Canadian Parliament o r the United Kingdom. This writer’s view is that it falls clearly 
under the power o f the Canadian Parliament over "Such Classes o f Subjects as are expressly excepted in 
the Enumeration o f the Classes o f Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the 
Provinces '. B.N.A. Act, s. 91(29). T he counter-argument is that because the Preamble o f the B.N.A. Act 
indicates Canada is to have “a Constitution similar in Principle to that o f the United Kingdom" and 
since residual power to amend the constitution at Confederation rested with the United Kingdom 
Parliament, not the Canadian Parliament, it could not have been intended to give the Canadian 
Parliament power to amend the Office o f Lieutenant Governor. Moreover, this Office is a right or 
privilege “secured to the Legislature or the Government o f  a province" which is expressly excluded 
from the Canadian go\em m ent's subsequently enacted amending power: B.N.A. Act, s. 91(1). Neither o f 
these arguments, in the writer's view, outweighs the express words o f s. 91(29), which are also consistent 
with the Lieutenant Governor's status as an appointee o f the Canadian government and originally as a 
federal watch-dog over provincial legislation: B.N.A. Act, ss. 58, 59 8c 90.
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T h e  Canadian Parliam ent can enact an am endm ent:
o f  the Constitution o f  Canada, except as regards matters coming within the 
classes o f  subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures o f  the 
provinces, or as regards rights or privileges by this or any other Constitutional 
Act granted or secured to the Legislature or the Government o f  a province, 
or to any class o f  persons with respect to schools or as regards the use o f  the 
F.nglLsh or the French language or as regards the requirements that there 
shall be a session o f  the Parliament o f  Canada at least once each year, and 
that no House o f  Commons shall continue for more than five years from the 
day o f  the return o f  the Writs for choosing the House: provided, however, 
that a House o f  Commons may in time o f  real or apprehended war, invasion 
or insurrection be continued by the Parliament o f  Canada if such 
continuation is not opposed by the votes o f  more than one-third o f  the 
members o f  such H ouse.8
Any o th er am endm ent requires an Act o f the U nited Kingdom 
Parliament.®
I'here is no question that the am endm ents to the C anadian 
constitution proposed by the central governm ent require enactm ent by 
the United Kingdom Parliam ent u n d er existing am endm ent procedures. 
The area o f  uncertainty is with respect to o th er procedural requirem ents 
for such am endm ents. Such requirem ents have never been fixed in any 
definitive legislative form . In 1871, the C anadian Parliam ent did resolve, 
but it did not legislate, that Parliam entary approval would be required  o f 
any request from  the Canadian governm ent to the U nited Kingdom for 
the enactm ent o f constitutional am endm ents.10 Some statutory support
"B.N .A . Act, s. 91(1), as enacted by the British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, IS Geo. VI, c. 81 (U.K.). 
On its face, this provision would seem to reduce the residuum of amendment power to those matters 
which are listed as exceptions. In its recent decision in Re: Authority o f Parliament in Relation to the Upper 
House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54, 30 N'.R. 271, the Supreme Court o f Canada held the Canadian government's 
amending power to be limited to matters o f interest only to the federal government. It held power to 
substantially alter the constitution o f the Canadian Senate was not within this power, even though it 
does not appear to fall under one of the enum erated exceptions. Since the stated purpose o f the 
Canadian government when it sought the insertion o f s. 91(1) in the B.N.A. Act was to enable it to deal 
with matters which concerned only the central government, and the exceptions were drafted 
accordingly, it is doubtful that there are many similar unenum erated exceptions. Moreover, in light of 
the Senate's nominally regional and provincial make-up, which was an important consideration to the 
(o u r t  (at 66-67 (S.C.R.), 281-283 (N'.R.)), it could conceivably be brought under the exception of rights 
secured to the provinces, notwithstanding the skepticism one might have as to whether any province 
would want this right. For a critique o f this case, noting in particular the irony that the objective of 
proposed Senate reform was to attempt to cure its past failure to act as an effective regional voice, see 
Hogg, P. W., “Constitutional Law — Federal Power to Amend the Constitution o f Canada — Reform of 
the Senate”, (1980) 58 Can. Bar Rev. 631, partic ularly at 639-642.
•This flows from the fact that the B.N.A. Act, which created Canada, is a statute o f the United 
Kingdom. Because o f this, the United Kingdom Parliament could also conceivably enact 
amendments which are within Canadian or provincial powers. While the United Kingdom Parliament 
might do so in a case where real doubt existed as to the validity of an amendment enacted within 
Canada, in other cases it would be likely to follow the precedent established in 1894 when the lower 
house in Nova Scotia’s then bi-cameral legislature sought a United Kingdom statute to overcome the 
unwillingness o f the upper house to be abolished. Upon receiving the second such request, the United 
Kingdom Government replied that it would not intervene since the provincial legislature had the 
necessary power: Forsey, E. A., “Provincial Requests for Amendments to the B.N.A. Act", (1966-67) 12 
McGill L.J. 397, at 398.
'•See Genn-La|oie, P., Constitutional Amendment in Canada. (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1950),
at 55-57.
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for this requirem ent, which has taken the form  o f either a jo in t 
resolution o r concurren t resolutions from  the Senate and House o f  
Com m ons, can be found  in the pream bles to some o f the resulting 
am endm ents which cite the existence o f  such resolutions.11
T h e  most authoritative statem ent o f  such requirem ents is one m ade 
by the C anadian M inister o f justice, Guy Favreau, in a W hite Paper in 
1965.12 T h e  M inister, afte r reviewing the history o f  C anadian 
constitutional am endm ent by the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent, stated:
The first general principle that emerges in the foregoing resumé is that although 
an enactment by the United Kingdom is necessary to amend the British North 
America Act, such action is taken only upon formal request from Canada. No 
Act o f  the United Kingdom Parliament affecting Canada is therefore passed 
unless it is requested and consented to by Canada. Conversely, every 
amendment requested by Canada in the past has been enacted.
The second, general principle is that the sanction o f  Parliament is required 
for a request to the British Parliament for an amendment to the British North 
America Act. This principle was established early in the history o f  Canada’s 
constitutional amendments, and has not been violated since 1895. The  
procedure invariably is to seek amendments by a joint Address o f  the 
Canadian House o f  Commons and Senate to the Crown.
The third general principle is that no amendment to Canada’s Constitution 
will be made by the British Parliament merely upon the request o f  a Canadian 
province. A number o f  attempts to secure such amendments have been made, 
but none has been successful. T he first such attempt was made as early as 
1868, by a province which was at that time dissatisfied with the terms o f  
Confederation. This was followed by other attempts in 1869, 1874 and 1887.
T he British Government refused in all cases to act on provincial government 
representations on the grounds that it should not intervene in the affairs o f  
Canada except at the request o f  the federal government representing all o f  
Canada.
The fourth general principle is that the Canadian Parliament will not request 
an amendment directly affecting federal-provincial relationships without prior 
consultation and agreement with the provinces. This principle did not emerge 
as early as others but since 1907, and particularly since 1930, has gained 
increasing recognition and acceptance. T he nature and the degree o f  
provincial participation in the amending process, however, have not lent 
themselves to easy definition.
T hese principles have, in fact, dom inated thinking about the 
am endm ent process for the last th ree decades. T hey were convincingly 
supported  at the beginning o f  this period by the leading scholarly work 
on C anada’s am endm ent process13 and by the central governm ent’s 
statem ents o f  position at the time that it obtained its own am ending 
pow er by the enactm ent o f  section 91(1) o f the B.N.A. Act. 14 They have
“ See, for example. British North America Act, 1964. 12-13 Eliz. 11, c. 73 (U.K.).
^Favreau, G., The Amendment o f the Constitution o f Canada. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), at 15. 
,sGérin-Lajoie, supra, footnote 10, at 135-203.
MSee Favreau, supra, footnote 12, at 23-26, and Gérin-Lajoie, supra, footnote 10, at xxxv-xl.
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been followed in practice th roughou t this period in the handful o f  
am endm ents that have actually been m ade and in the approach to 
constitutional reform  during  the short-lived 1950 discussions and the 
protracted  discussions o f the 1960’s and 1970’s.
While in earlier periods the dom inant view may have been that 
involvement o f  the provinces was entirely at the discretion o f the federal 
governm ent,15 the last th ree decades represen t the contem porary period 
in Canadian constitutional developm ent. In 1949, no t only did the 
Canadian Parliam ent acquire the pow er to actually make limited 
am endm ents to the constitution o f  C anada w ithout involving the U nited 
Kingdom Parliam ent, but also the C anadian Suprem e C ourt acquired 
final jurisdiction free from  a right o f  appeal to the Judicial Com m ittee 
o f the Privy Council.16 T hese two steps com pleted the developm ent o f 
C anadian independence from  U nited Kingdom institutions (apart from  
the figure-head role o f  the Crown) insofar as such independence could 
be achieved in the absence o f  some new arrangem ent fo r constitutional 
am endm ents jointly concerning the central and provincial governm ents.
In light o f  the experience since 1949, it seems fair to say that, at 
least in the non-legal sense, the p ro p er procedure for constitutional 
am endm ent in Canada has been as set ou t by the M inister o f Justice in 
1965. On this basis, the central governm ent’s present course o f  action is 
unconstitutional, at least in the non-legal sense. It is so because, contrary 
to the “fourth  general principle”, there is no agreem ent with at least
l5These views are reviewed by Gerin-tajoie, supra, f<x>tnote 10, at 204-217. Similar views have been 
expressed in some subsequent writings, for example. B. task  in. “Amendment o f the Constitution”, 
(1963) 15 U. Toronto L J . 190, at 191. and E. R. Alexander, "A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada”, 
(1965) 43 Can. Bar Rev. 262, at 264-268. Alexander's article provides little more than his personal 
preference for the earlier view over, that o f (¿erin-Lajoie. While taskin 's opinion could be of particular 
significance in light o f the fact that he is now Chief Justice o f Canada, in this article he expressed little 
more than a passing comment. He described the amending procedure as “legally flexible”. This was 
written prior to the 1965 White Paper, supra, footnote 12. The White Paper constituted the first clear 
articulation o f the amending procedure, task in 's comment merely reflects the uncertainty over that 
procedure w hich still existed when he wrote. The opinion of the Minister of Justice, formally expressed 
in the White Paper, should c a m  more weight. See also the strongly expressed view supporting the 
requirem ent o f provincial consent in W. R. l^derm an, “The Progress o f Constitutional Amendment for 
Canada”, (1966-67) 12 McGill L.J. 371, at 376-381. Significantly this view was expressed after the 
procedure had been articulated by th'e 1965 W'hite Paper.
A more recent contrary view is that expressed in M. Lalonde and R. Basford, The Canadian 
Constitution and Constitutional Amendment (Ottawa: Federal Provinc ial Relations Office, 1978), at 13. In a 
section entitled “Observations Based on Past Practice”, this paper makes four “observations" which 
closely parallel the four "principles" o f the 1965 While Paper. T here is one important difference, 
however. T he 1978 paper states that the central government was "not constitutionally obliged to do so" 
when it sought provincial consent to amendments involving the distribution o f powers. Although it 
might be contended that this paper, under the co-authorship o f the Minister o f Justice, should be given 
weight similar to the 1965 White Paper, it is submitted that this cannot be the case. The 1978 paper was 
clearly a self-serving position paper o f the central government prepared in support o f another proposal 
for unilateral action, the Constitutional Amendment Bill, Canada, 1978, Bill C-60. Moreover, the 
Constitutional Amendment Bill itself recognized that constitutional amendments must be dealt with in 
accordance with "accepted usage" in the absence o f any express procedure in the Constitution itself: s. 
125.
16Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-19, s. 54. This was enacted by An Act to amend the Supreme Court 
Act, S.C. 1949 (2d Sess.), c. 37, s. 3.
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seven and possibly eight o f the provinces. It is even arguable that there 
was insufficient prior consultation with m ost o f  the provinces since the 
discussions which took place occurred w ithout knowledge o f  what the 
central governm ent proposed to in troduce by way o f constitutional 
am endm ent. T he  process o f  negotiation over a variety o f options, 
some ra ther far-reaching, is not the same thing as a process o f 
consultation on relatively limited and specific proposals. While little 
inform ation has been m ade public about consultations which may have 
taken place after the central governm ent announced its intention to 
proceed unilaterally, it seems doubtful that there has been much real 
consultation, particularly in the case o f  those provinces which have 
announced strong opposition.
T h e  tradition o f constitutional change in C anada is evolutionary, not 
revolutionary. Even if the principles in the 1965 W hite Paper are purely 
non-legal, and therefore subject to change without any formal action 
being necessary, the change in p rocedure announced by the Prime 
M inister was radical. This provides fu r th e r grounds for labelling the 
intent to proceed unilaterally as unconstitutional in the non-legal sense.
This leaves the question o f  w hether the central governm ent’s 
proposal is also unconstitutional in the legal sense. Its radical nature is 
obviously o f no relevance to this question, but the violation o f  the 
principles o f the 1965 W'hite Paper may be.
A num ber o f factors can be advanced in support o f the proposition 
that these principles are legally binding in C anada. At the level o f 
fundam ental policy is the federal structu re o f  Canada. It has been 
recognized by o u r courts since the decision in Hodge v. The Queen17 that 
the central and provincial governm ents are each, within their 
constitutional powers, sovereign and suprem e. It is quite inconsistent 
with this concept that in relation to the constitution which determ ines 
what those powers are the central governm ent should have the unilateral 
power to make fundam ental changes. It is equally in violation o f this 
concept that the United Kingdom Parliam ent in exercising a formal 
am ending power at C anada’s request should make fundam ental changes 
in response to a unilateral initiative o f the central governm ent.
In two recent cases involving the attem pted o r proposed exercise o f 
the am endm ent powers o f the provinces and the central governm ent 
respectively, the courts have draw n upon Canadian constitutional history 
to determ ine the real intent o f  the constitu tion.lS A similar examination 
o f the am ending powers as a whole strongly supports the conclusion that
IT(1883), 9 A.C. 117. at 132 (P.C.).
'“Alt.-Gen. (¿uelec v. Blaikv, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016, 101 D.I..R. (3d) 394; at 1017 (S.C.R.), 401 (D.L.R.), 
adopting the reasons on appeal and at trial in Quebec as to history: [1978] C.A. 351, 95 D.L..R. (3d) 42; 
affirming [1978] C.S. 37, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 252; Re: Authority o f Parliament in Relation to the Upper House, 
supra, footnote 8, at 60-69 (S.C.R ), 276-285 (N.R.).
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the power rem aining today in the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent was 
intended for exercise only with the m utual consent o f  the central and 
provincial governm ents. T h e  passage o f  the Statute of Westminster, 1931,19 
as well the British North America Act, 1867 and the British North America 
(No. 2) Act, 1949 m ark m ajor stages in this history.
During the period from  1867 to 1931, C anada was evolving from  a 
colony to an independent nation. At the beginning o f this stage there 
was a real possibility o f occasional intervention by the U nited Kingdom 
in Canadian affairs. W hen the power to revise the federal constitution 
was left in the hands o f  the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent, and at the same 
time the provinces were granted their own powers o f  constitutional am end­
m ent, it was surely conceived that the preservation o f the basic federal 
structure was to be ensured by the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent. If it 
had been intended that the Canadian Parliam ent was to effectively 
control constitutional am endm ent, it would have been given am endm ent 
powers.
D uring this period the actual history o f  involvement o f the U nited 
Kingdom governm ent indicates that, although it pursued a policy o f 
non-intervention in Canadian constitutional affairs, it did not renounce 
the possibility o f  such intervention. Indeed it exercised an interventionist 
role in 1907 when it revised an am endm ent proposal subm itted by the 
central governm ent following a provincial objection so that, arguably at 
least, it elim inated the feature most objectionable to the province.20
United Kingdom intervention in Canadian affairs became unaccept­
able for general purposes as the attainm ent o f full political 
independence from  the United Kingdom came closer. U nder the Statute 
of Westminster, the legal fram ew ork for such intervention was abolished. 
However, the Statute was not to apply to the am endm ent o f  the 
British North America Act. 21 This provision was adopted with the 
unanim ous consent o f  the provinces. It cannot have been in tended to 
transfer any new power over am endm ents to the central governm ent; 
rather, on its face it preserves the legal power o f  intervention by the 
United Kingdom governm ent which had previously existed. It was 
realized, o f course, that the likelihood o f such intervention, should it be 
desired to resolve some fu tu re  C anadian constitutional crisis, had 
become extrem ely rem ote. This placed a certain urgency on the 
developm ent o f  a C anadian mechanism for constitutional am endm ent 
and efforts to achieve agreem ent on such a mechanism ensued in the 
1930’s.
Following the Second World W'ar, C anada moved to the 
contem porary stage o f  the history o f constitutional am endm ent pow er
Geo. V, t. 4 (U.K.).
20See Gerin-Lajoie, supra, footnote 10. at 74-83. 
t 'Supra, footnote 19, s. 7(1).
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with the adoption o f the central governm ent’s am ending power. This 
gave the central governm ent, for the first time, the power to pass 
am endm ents w ithout involvement by the United Kingdom Parliament. 
Again it could hardly have been intended that am endm ents not covered 
by this provision, but still requiring United Kingdom involvement, 
should be enacted upon the sole initiative o f  the central governm ent. 
O therw ise, power to m ake such am endm ents would have been included 
directly in the central governm ent’s am ending power. On the contrary, 
the limited scope o f this am ending pow er confirm s the intention that 
am endm ents concerning the provinces require provincial agreem ent 
since it elim inated U nited Kingdom involvement in those m atters where 
provincial consent is not required , that is, up to the limit o f  the central 
governm ent’s power to am end the constitution on its unilateral 
initiative.22
This constitutional history underlies the legislative provisions 
presently governing the process o f  constitutional reform  in C anada and 
it is enforceable by the courts in the process o f  in terpre ting  and 
applying these provisions. Section 7(1) o f  the Statute of Westminster, 
preserving the power o f  the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent to intervene in 
C anadian affairs, was intended to protect the integrity o f the federal 
system. Section 91(1) o f  the British North America Act, by conferring 
power on the C anadian Parliam ent to unilaterally am end the 
constitution insofar as previously it could be am ended on the unilateral 
initiative o f  the central governm ent, precludes o ther unilateral 
am endm ents, w hether by the C anadian Parliam ent acting alone o r by 
the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent acting on the unilateral initiative o f  the 
C anadian Parliament.
Even if the relevant legislative provisions were not subject to this 
in terpretation, the constitutional conventions outlined in the 1965 White 
Paper could be judicially enforceable in C anada. T h e  view that 
conventions are not legally enforceable derives from  the constitutional 
law o f  the U nited Kingdom. Judicial review o f  the conduct o f o ther 
agencies o f governm ent plays a fundam entally d ifferen t role in the 
C anadian constitution. For example, judicial review o f  the Acts o f
21 It may be noted that, in the interval between the Statute of Westminster. 1931, and the enactment o f 
section 91(1) o f the B.N.A. Act, there occurred the one clear instance when the United King­
dom Parliament passed an amendment over the actual objection o f a province. Quebec objected in 
1943 to an amendment to defer redistribution o f Parliament to the end o f the War: see Gerin-Lajoie,
supra, footnote 10, at 109-117. Although the Prime Minister, Mr. King, made some statements to the 
effect that constitutional amendments by the United Kingdom Parliament should be automatically 
adopted upon the request of the Canadian Parliament, the princ ipal theme of the central government, 
and in partic ular o f the Minister o f Justice, Mr. St.-Laurent, was that this amendment was purely a 
m atter o f concern to the central government. While some statements in the United Kingdom Parliament 
also support the view that it should not inquire into possible provincial objections, it appears that there 
was no real canvass o f this issue. Although, in light o f the decision in Re: Authority o f Parliament in 
Relation to the Upper House, supra, footnote 8, this amendment was close to the borderline o f provincial 
concern, redistribution o f seats in Parliament now seems clearly accepted as a matter for amendment 
under s. 91(1) of the B.N.A. Act: see, for example, British North America Act (No. 2), 1974, as enacted by 
the Representation Act, 1974, S.C.. 1974-75-76, c. 13. ss. 2-3. This confirms that it was a matter o f 
exclusive concern to the central government and that provincial objections were irrelevant.
8 2 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
Parliam ent is virtually unknown in the United Kingdom constitution 
because o f parliam entary supremacy. Such judicial review is a keystone 
o f  the Canadian constitution even though it is recognized that the 
central and provincial legislatures share parliam entary supremacy. 
“Share” is the crucial word here  fo r it is the fact o f  shared supremacy 
which necessitates a constitutional arbiter and hence judicial review. It is 
this same fact o f  sharing which gives rise to the constitutional convention 
o f  requiring provincial consultation and agreem ent to constitutional 
am endm ents affecting the provinces. T h e  central governm ent’s present 
violation o f  this convention renders judicial intervention equally 
necessitous.
T hese conventions were judicially recognized in Re: Authority of 
Parliament in Relation to the Upper House.23 This is an im portant step 
toward judicial enforcem ent o f  these conventions. Indeed, in in te rp re t­
ing the federal power o f  am endm ent as limited to m atters o f  interest to 
the federal governm ent only, the C ourt was effectively enforcing the 
very convention in issue here, namely, that am endm ents affecting 
federal-provincial relationships require prio r consultation and agreem ent 
with the provinces.
THE CASE SUPPORTING THE FEDERAL PROPOSAL
T h e  principal argum ents available to the central governm ent in 
support o f  the legality o f  its course o f  action would appear to be, first, 
there  has been substantial compliance with conventional requirem ents; 
second, these requirem ents are not legally enforceable in any event; and 
th ird , even if they are legally enforceable, the passage o f  an Act o f  the 
U nited Kingdom Parliam ent will cure any legal defect.
It is not clear w hether the substantial com pliance them e which 
appears in the central governm ent’s position in support o f  its proposals24 
is in tended purely to gain political support, o r m ight actually form  the 
basis o f  a legal argum ent. Elements o f this them e are that the 
am endm ent form ula was essentially agreed to by the provinces du ring  
the round o f discussions which term inated in Victoria in 1971, the items 
on regional disparity and provincial resource rights were areas o f accord 
in the 1980 constitutional discussions, the provisions on language in 
education conform  to positions taken by the Premiers at their 
Conferences in 1977 and 1978, and the rest o f  the C harter o f  Rights 
does not affect the balance o f  power between the central and provincial 
governm ents which is presumably the principal legitimate concern o f  
federalism .
23Supra, footnote 8, at 63-64 (S.C.R.), 279-80 (N.R.). It should be noted that no similar honour is paid to 
the crucially differing observations on amending procedures in the central government's 1978 paper: 
supra, footnote 15.
,4See, for example, Chretien. J., “Constitutional Reform, Notes for a Speech”, House o f Commons, 
October 6, 1980.
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In the first place, actual practice favours the view that only full 
compliance with the provincial consent requirem ent is acceptable. For 
exam ple, un d er the conditions o f economic depression in the 1930’s, the 
central governm ent delayed m ore than two years in o rd e r to obtain 
provincial consent afte r it had decided to seek a constitutional 
am endm ent perm itting it to enact valid unem ploym ent insurance 
legislation.25
Even if substantial compliance is sufficient, the com pliance has been 
far from  substantial. T h e  1971 am ending form ula was only tentatively 
approved at Victoria, and the Q uebec Prem ier later exercised the right, 
which he had reserved, to refuse consent. T h e  Prem iers’ 1977 and 1978 
agreem ents on language in education were reached in the context o f  an 
understanding  that education was an area o f exclusive provincial 
concern which, to som e Prem iers at least, m eant that this should be a 
m atter o f provincial governm ent policy and not one o f constitutional 
m andate. A constitutionally entrenched C harter o f  Rights has the 
potential for reducing provincial legislative power. W hether power is 
shifted to the central governm ent o r simply subtracted from the 
provinces, it is nonetheless a dim inution o f provincial com petence.
T h ere  is fu rth e r potential for shifting the balance o f pow er under 
the C harter, even though it purports only to subtract power from  
governm ent. This is because the courts, w hether o r not expressly 
directed as u n d er the proposed C h arte r,26 are likely to uphold 
legislation which apparently  infringes fundam ental rights if they find 
some countervailing interest outw eighing the infringem ent in question. 
U nder the double aspect approach to central and provincial powers in 
C anada, there are many areas where the respective powers effectively 
overlap. However, the double aspect arises because the underlying 
central and provincial interests are distinct. It is possible, if not indeed 
likely, that in a particular area legislation based on one interest will 
survive a C harte r o f  Rights challenge, while that based on the o ther 
interest will not. T he  practical result could be to exclude one level o f  
governm ent o r the o th er from an area in which both form erly had 
power, that is, a shift in the balance o f  power.
T h e  argum ent has been set ou t above for legal enforcem ent o f the 
convention o f provincial consultation and agreem ent to constitutional 
am endm ents such as those proposed. Apart from  the possibility that this 
is what the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada was really doing in Re: Authority of 
Parliament in Relation to the Upper House, 27 there is as yet no legal 
precedent for judicial enforcem ent o f constitutional conventions in
2*Conshtulton Act, 1980, s. I, Schedule B of Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the 
Queen respecting the Constitution o f Canada, supra, footnote I.
25See (»¿rin-l.ajoie, supra, footnote 10. at 105-107.
27Supra, footnote 8.
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C anada. T h e  central governm ent’s argum ent would be that such a 
precedent should not be set.
Presumably one o f  the main objections to setting such a precedent is 
that conventions should be flexible to allow for appropriate  change, and 
that after fifty years o f  constitutional stalemate change is appropriate. In 
response, it is subm itted that one o f  the fundam ental characteristics o f a 
constitution, particularly in a federal system, is that it contains provisions 
that are relatively im mutable. T herefo re , the procedure for change 
ought to be difficult. T h e  fact that the procedure has m ade change too 
difficult is not a valid argum ent for changing it. Judicial enforcem ent is 
the ultim ate guarantee o f  the constitution against expediency.
Perhaps the weakest point in the argum ent for judicial enforcem ent 
o f the convention, and therefo re a point which the central governm ent’s 
case is likely to emphsize, is that the convention does not apparently 
require anything m ore in the way o f  provincial consent than the word o f 
the Prem ier. Recent decisions involving the anti-inflation program  have 
em phasized the necessity o f legislative action to support changes in the 
law.28 Constitutional reform  fundam entally changes the law. T h e  fact 
that convention requires no m ore than the word o f  the Prem ier suggests 
there is no real legal requirem ent o f provincial consent. Only the 
provincial legislature could properly give any required  provincial 
consent on such a m atter.
T h e  answ er to this argum ent is that the anti-inflation cases only 
assert the necessity o f some valid legislative authority for a change in the 
law. Since the federal legislation did not provide authority for changes 
being effected in provincial law, provincial legislation was necessary. In 
the case o f constitutional am endm ent, legislation is also necessary, but 
the only appropriate  legislative body is the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent.
While legislative involvement in the form o f a Parliam entary 
resolution is required  with respect to the central governm ent’s request 
for an am endm ent, this is because the Canadian Parliam ent itself has 
imposed such a requirem ent, as it is entitled to do  u nder the principles 
o f responsible governm ent. Provincial legislatures are free to impose 
similar limitations on the provincial executive. In the absence o f any 
such limitations, however, the lack o f provincial legislative involvement 
has no legal significance because the only legislative action which 
constitutionally is e ither necessary for o r capable o f am ending the 
constitution as proposed is that o f  the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent. This 
does not m ean that the courts should not recognize o r enforce an 
existing requirem ent, w hether that o f the Canadian Parliam ent o r  a 
provincial legislature, that am endm ent should be m ade only upon its
"Referm er re Anti-lnflatwn Act [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373. 68 D.I..R. (3d) 452. at 427-436 (S.C.R.), 499-506 
(D.1..R.); Re Manitoba Govemmmt Employees Association and Manitoba, [1978] I S.C.R. 1 123, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 
I. at 1136-1146 (S.C.R.). 10-18 (D.L.R.).
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resolution. It merely means that it is not the concern o f  the courts where 
such requirem ents do not exist. Since it has no necessary legislative role 
in the m atter, it is up  to the provincial legislature w hether it wishes to 
leave the expression o f consent o r denial o f  consent to the Prem ier and 
Cabinet who presum ably have its confidence.
Similarly there  is no significance to the lack o f  formality in the way 
in which provincial agreem ent has been expressed in the past. This 
agreem ent is essentially a political act, and not an act o f  state. 
Inform ality may pose certain evidentiary problem s for a court being 
asked to review the validity o f  a constitutional am endm ent, but the 
substance o f the issue is too im portant to justify the courts tu rn ing  a 
blind-eye merely because occasionally the p icture may be a bit blurred . 
T h e  political n a tu re  o f  the provinces’ agreem ent does not mean that the 
courts are asked to perform  a political act by enforcing the constitutional 
convention since the role o f  the courts is purely one o f  finding the facts, 
w hether o r not there was agreem ent, and not one o f judg ing  the 
motivation.
T h e  legal force o f  passage by the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent is 
probably the strongest branch o f  the central governm ent’s argum ent. It 
seems likely that this is the main explanation for the central 
governm ent’s haste in the m atter. If  a judicial ruling that the central 
governm ent was acting unconstitutionally were obtained p rio r to passage 
by the United Kingdom Parliam ent, norm al respect fo r the law would 
likely halt fu r th e r action by the central governm ent. It would also 
provide the United Kingdom Parliam ent with an excellent excuse for 
taking no action in what, for it, is a no-win situation since it is going to 
be accused o f  in terference in C anadian affairs w hether it passes o r 
rejects the proposed constitutional reform . However, if passage can be 
obtained before a definitive judicial ruling is m ade, there is a good 
chance that the historically unreviewable supremacy o f  the U nited 
Kingdom Parliam ent w ill effect a fa it accompli that the courts will be 
compelled to accept.
While the U nited Kingdom ParMament is recognized as being above 
judicial review within its own constitution, it is subm itted that it should 
not be so viewed in its Canadian constitutional context. Judicial review o f 
legislation is an accepted part o f the Canadian constitution. T h ere  is no 
reason why such review should not apply to the U nited Kingdom 
Parliam ent when it acts as a constitutional legislature for Canada, as 
m uch as to the central anJ provincial legislatures when they are so 
acting. C anada, since the abolition o f appeals to the Judicial Com mittee 
o f the Privy Council, has a legal system independent o f  the United 
Kingdom. T hus, the fact that the United Kingdom Parliam ent is 
absolutely suprem e as a m atter o f  U nited Kingdom law- does not mean 
that it must be absolutely suprem e as a m atter o f Canadian law.
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T h e  implications o f a contrary view are inimical to the very concept 
o f  Canadian independence. If  Canadian law recognizes the absolute 
suprem acy o f U nited Kingdom Parliam ent, then it would have to 
recognize a statute o f  that Parliam ent which reduced o r even abolished 
C anadian independence, particularly since o u r independence rests only 
upon U nited Kingdom statutes in the first place. Even if the U nited 
Kingdom Parliam ent is unlikely to actually attem pt this, the foundations 
o f  Canadian independence cannot rest purely on this basis. T h e  juristic 
basis o f o u r independence m ust surely be that any legislative attem pt by 
the United Kingdom to reassert such influence in Canadian affairs 
would be ultra vires w here Canadian law is concerned. In o th er words, 
such legislation would fall u n d e r the powers o f  judicial review held by 
o u r  courts.
It does not follow, o f  course, that the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent 
has lost its absolute suprem acy insofar as it deals with m atters such as 
constitutional reform  w here it does retain pow er over C anada. However, 
if judicial review is conceivable in the one case, then it is conceivable in 
the o ther. T h e  obligation o f  the courts to uphold the integrity o f  the 
federal system is parallel to the obligation to uphold Canadian 
independence.
THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF HOLDING THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A practical consideration which is likely to bear upon a cou rt’s 
decision is the possible constitutional dilem m a that m ight face C anada if 
the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent enacted the central governm ent’s 
proposed am endm ents and the courts subsequently held them  to be 
legally unconstitutional. Such a ruling would m ean that the C anadian 
constitution would rem ain as it was prio r to these am endm ents. In o ther 
words, the residual am ending power would rem ain in the hands o f  the 
United Kingdom Parliam ent to be exercised on the request o f  the 
central governm ent after consultation and agreem ent with the provinces.
From the U nited Kingdom perspective, however, there would be 
good reason for refusing to exercise this power in the fu ture. Since the 
U nited Kingdom constitution does not have judicial review o f 
Parliam entary legislation, the am endm ents would be legally valid as a 
m atter o f  the law o f  the U nited Kingdom. T h e  possibility o f  such 
d iffe ren t legal positions is one o f the consequences o f  the separation o f 
the judicial system o f  C anada from  that o f  the U nited Kingdom in 1949, 
and provides an illustration o f the rationale for the separation .29 In light 
o f  this, and also in view o f  the political inconvenience that pow er over 
the C anadian constitution may entail, as dem onstrated  by the curren t 
am endm ent experience, the U nited Kingdom governm ent might well
2*Supra, footnote Hi.
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decline to exercise any fu rth e r role in am ending the Canadian 
constitution. While a precedent does exist for a resum ption o f colonial 
authority  that had been legally relinquished, that is, the case o f 
New foundland which su rren d ered  its independent status as a result o f  
financial disaster d u rin g  the 1930’s, it may be doubted w hether the 
U nited Kingdom would wish to follow this p recedent in the Canadian 
case. It should be rem em bered that in the 1930’s the U nited Kingdom 
was still a m ajor colonial pow er and New foundland requested a 
com plete re tu rn  to colonial status u n d er that power.
F u rth er involvem ent in relatively limited and  formal role in the 
C anadian constitutional am endm ent process is likely to be singularly 
unattractive to the U nited Kingdom in the fu ture. It is true that there 
would probably be no fu rth e r problem s with situations in which the 
central and provincial governm ents were opposed since, u n d er the legal 
ruling suggested above, there would be no point in taking am endm ents 
to the U nited Kingdom without agreem ent between these governm ents. 
However, this would not necessarily prevent o th er interested parties 
from  attem pting to lobby in the U nited Kingdom, as has occurred in the 
cu rren t case.
If  the proposed am endm ents are invalid u n d er C anadian law, but 
valid u n d er U nited Kingdom law, a question which arises is w hether the 
Canadian constitution might be legally caught in a no-person’s land, 
regardless o f  w hether the U nited Kingdom governm ent m ight be willing 
to act from the political perspective. Is it possible that the steps which 
would be necessary u n d er U nited Kingdom law to get the United 
Kingdom Parliam ent to once again am end the C anadian constitution 
would be steps that, within Canada, it would be constitutionally 
impossible for the central and provincial governm ents to perform ? This 
could happen if legislation is required  u n d er the am ending form ula for 
fu tu re  am endm ents. If the proposed am endm ent package is valid u nder 
U nited Kingdom law, as it probably is, the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent 
could consider itself obliged not to intervene fu rth e r in Canadian 
constitutional affairs unless the residual am ending power were re tu rned  
to it by a constitutional am endm ent adopted in accordance with the 
p rocedure prescribed by the proposed Constitution Act.30 However, if the 
proposed am endm ent package is invalid u n d er C anadian law, as is 
subm itted, any legislation in C anada attem pting to re tu rn  the power to 
am end the constitution to the United Kingdom Parliam ent would be 
invalid because u n d er the previously and still existing C anadian 
constitution such m atters are beyond the power o f  anyone in Canada. 
T o  break out o f  this conundrum , either the United Kingdom Parliam ent 
o r C anadian legislative authorities would have to act in deliberate 
d isregard  o f what their legal systems regard as lawful.
30Supra. footnote 26. s. 41(1).
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T his problem  would not arise u n d er the proposed am ending 
form ula at the point o f initial action by either the central Parliam ent o r 
the provincial legislatures. In each case only resolutions would be 
required. Since resolutions are not laws, there should be no 
constitutional objection to a resolution on any subject, regardless o f 
w hether o r not it fell within the legislative powers o f  the legislature.
T h e  problem  would arise, however, at the stage when any fu tu re 
am endm ents received legislative effect. This would occur upon the 
proclam ation o f an am endm ent by the G overnor-G eneral. U nder the 
present constitution the G overnor-G eneral has no legislative power 
whatsoever based on m ere Parliamentary resolution, much less a power 
to am end the constitution. T hus, any such proclam ation would be 
im proper in C anada if the curren t proposals are unconstitutional. Unless 
the G overnor-G eneral were to deliberately violate constitutional law as 
recognized in Canada, the pow er to m ake fu rth e r am endm ents could 
not formally be relinquished back to the U nited Kingdom. T h e  United 
Kingdom Parliam ent, on the o th er hand, could be o f  the view that 
u n d er its law it would be acting illegally to again intervene in the 
C anadian constitution without such relinquishm ent.
If there  is any legal solution to this conundrum , apart from simply 
accepting fo r C anadian purposes the validity o f the proposed 
am endm ents once enacted by the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent, it 
revolves around  the issue o f w hether the United Kingdom Parliam ent is 
bound by “m anner and fo rm ” requirem ents,31 and w hether it should 
adopt the same approach to conventional “m anner and fo rm ” 
requirem ents as to statutory ones. T h e  requirem ent o f  provincial 
agreem ent un d er the present am endm ent p rocedure and the require­
ment of a certain combination o f  central and provincial resolutions 
followed by a Proclamation by the Governor-G eneral u n d er the 
proposed am ending p rocedure are both “m anner and form ” require­
ments from  the perspective of the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent. If it is 
bound by l>oth, the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent would have to accept a 
determ ination that the proposed am endm ents are invalid, and this 
would leave it free to act again. If it is bound by neither requirem ent, 
the United Kingdom Parliam ent would also be legally free to ignore the 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1980 and to ac t again.
1 here  is a real danger, however, that the legal view prevailing in the 
U nited Kingdom would be that the requirem ent o f provincial agreem ent 
is not binding, but that the requirem ents o f the proposed am ending 
form ula would be, once the latter had been enacted by the U nited 
Kingdom Parliam ent. Canadian courts have an obligation to the federal 
system, and no strong com peting concern apart from  legal formalism.
a ,For the view that "m anner and form ” requirements are binding even on the United Kingdom 
Parliament, see Tarnopolsky, W. S., Tht Canadian Bill o f Rights, 2d rev. ed. (Toronto: McClelland and
Stew art. 1975), at ‘*2-1 12.
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This could, and in the w riter’s view should, induce them  to enforce the 
provincial agreem ent requ irem ent in respect o f am endm ents concerning 
the provinces. However, the U nited Kingdom governm ent must consider 
the impact o f  a precedent in relation to its legal relations with o ther 
colonies and form er colonies and as well in relation to its domestic 
Parliam entary system. If it accepts the enforceability o f  non-s? »tutory 
“m anner and form ” requirem ents in this case, it may be called upon to 
do the same with respect to long observed practices in the U nited 
Kingdom Parliam ent. For its own purposes, the principle o f  supremacy 
o f Parliam ent could be seen as outweighing any non-stati .o r y  
requirem ents. On the o th er hand , enforcem ent o f statutory require­
ments, such as those in the proposed am ending form ula, may actually be 
supportive o f  the concept o f  supremacy o f Parliam ent. T hus, the 
tendency may be in favour o f such enforcem ent.
O ne way the courts might avoid this dilem m a would be to treat the 
passage o f the central governm ent’s proposals by the United Kingdom 
Parliam ent as legally effective only on a conditional basis. It could be 
regarded as binding on the central governm ent and the United 
Kingdom Parliam ent, bu t suspended in its operation until the 
appropriate steps were taken within C anada to give it effect by obtaining 
the requisite provincial consents. Since the requirem ent is agreem ent o f 
all the provinces, this suspension would continue until such agreem ent 
had been achieved.32
A part from  the possibility o f  such a dilemma, the likelihood is that, 
at most, the United Kingdom might be prevailed upon to act one m ore 
time if the cu rren t proposals are held invalid by the Canadian courts. It 
seems almost certain they would insist that all legal objections be 
resolved in advance. T his would mean that, in the m eantim e, o u r 
constitution would literally be in a strait-jacket. Up until the present, 
while overall agreem ent on general constitutional revision has been the 
goal, it was always possible that agreem ent on a particular item might be 
developed on an urgent basis. For example, this would have been a 
conceivable recourse to avoid questions over the validity o f the 
Anti-Inflation Act. 33 T h e  U nited Kingdom Parliam ent would almost 
certainly have responded readily in such a situation. It is unlikely to do 
so in the fu tu re  if it passes the central governm ent’s proposals and this is 
held invalid by C anadian courts.
If the U nited Kingdom Parliam ent were to refuse altogether to act 
again in the fu tu re , the only possible ways out o f the impasse would be
•’Ml is interesting to ao 'c  »hat the central government's previous proposal to proceed unilaterally with 
constitutional reform  would have operated on a very similar basis, that is, immediate enabling legislation 
which, insofar as it concerned the provinces, would only have come into force and actually altered the 
constitution when the provinces took corresponding action: Constitutional Amendment Bill, supra, footnote 
15, s. 125. However, a major difference is that under Bill C-60 the Charter o f Rights would have come 
into effect immtdiately upon adoption on a province by province basis: s. 131.
33S.C. 1974-75-76. c. 75.
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either subsequent provincial agreem ent to the existing am endm ents 
which the courts are likely realistically to accept o r some o th er legal coup 
d'etat by the central and provincial governm ents in concert which again 
the courts are  likely realistically to accept. It is subm itted that any such 
possibility, since it would preserve the federal principle, is preferable to 
judicial acceptance o f  the central governm ent’s unilateral approach.
AN OPTION FOR ESCAPING CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE
It must be recognized that there is some validity to the central 
governm ent’s concern that constitutional change has become imperative. 
I here is also some basis for the feeling that at some stage continued 
negotiation can become fruitless. Even if the central governm ent’s 
assessment that negotiations were hopelessly deadlocked in 1980 was 
prem ature, if not indeed part o f  a calculated strategy by the central 
governm ent, past experience has shown that at least one out o f ten 
provinces is likely to disagree with any given proposal. It would be 
unfair to close, after such strong criticism o f the central governm ent’s 
proposed impasse resolution, w ithout offering some alternative.
In the event there is an unavoidable deadlock between the central 
governm ent and the provinces, there would appear to be only one 
appropriate  arb iter on an issue such as this. Since the issue involves 
substantial reform  o f  the constitution, that arb iter is not the courts 
whose reform ing role is interstitial. N either is it- the United Kingdom 
Parliament at this stage in o u r history.
T he  only possible arbiter is the C anadian people. T h e  people cannot 
act in this m atter th rough their representatives in Parliam ent, because 
those representatives are too involved with one side o f  the dispute: the 
central governm ent. T h e  only solution would seem to be a national 
referendum  with the result based on provincial m ajorities so that no 
province can later protest that its people did not consent. While legally a 
re ferendum  may be as questionable as the central governm ent’s 
unilateral action, in real term s it should resolve most legitimate doubts 
about the acceptability o f  the proposed constitutional reform . Such 
referenda are w idely used as a m eans o f constitutional reform . Such an 
approach to constitutional stalem ate would seem far preferable to the 
course o f  action taken by the central governm ent.
